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POWERS V. HARRIS: HOW THE TENTH CIRCUIT BURIED
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES
A democracy is nothing more than mob rule, where fifty-one percent
of the people may take away the rights of the other forty-nine.
- Thomas Jefferson

I

I. INTRODUCTION

Thomas Jefferson recognized this inherent problem with our democratic system: A democratic government unchecked does not prevent
a legislature from enacting naked preferences. A naked preference is an
evil that can by defined as "the distribution of resources or opportunities
to one group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored
have exercised the raw political power to obtain what they want." 3 Interest group politics have posed a problem since the time of our founding
fathers.4 In fact, the problem of "faction" greatly concerned James
Madison and was one of the reasons the Constitution was enacted.5
Fortunately, the Constitution now provides individuals with some
protection of their liberties against the whims of state government majorities. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents state legislatures from
encroaching on certain individual liberties. 6 The relevant text of the
amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws. 7

However, these clauses have little effect in modem constitutional
law, especially when applied to economic liberties, and "have been spun

1. Available at http://www.wisdomquotes.com/cat-democracy.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2005).
Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689,
2.
1689(1984).
Id.
3.
4. Steven Simpson, JudicialAbdication and the Rise of Special Interest, 6 CHAP. L. REV.
173, 173 (2003).
Id.
5.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6.
7.
Id.
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into a quagmire of convoluted jurisprudence
so entangled that some ju8
rists have suggested their elimination.,
In Powers v. Harris,9 the U.S Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals further limited the protection offered by the Fourteenth Amendment.'0 The
Court broke with past precedent in deciding that state governments could
permissibly enact legislation for the sole purpose of intrastate economic
protectionism." In doing so, they also split with a U.S. Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision involving an almost identical fact pattern in
Craigmiles v. Giles. This dangerous holding has drastic implications
for economic liberties because it gives state governments the virtually
unchecked authority to meddle in the economic affairs of their citizenry.
This comment will argue that Powers was decided incorrectly, while
Craigmiles was decided correctly. The court in Powers wrongly declared naked economic protectionism to be a legitimate government end.
The Tenth Circuit should have held such economic protectionism, by
itself, to be an illegitimate government purpose. Then, it should have
correctly applied the rational basis test as the Craigmiles Court did to
determine that the Oklahoma legislation restricting the sale of caskets
was not rationally related to any other legitimate government purpose.
Part II of this comment will discuss the legal principles underlying
economic liberty jurisprudence and the current state of the law. Part

M

of this comment will describe the facts of Powers and the decision
reached by the 10th Circuit. Part IV will describe the facts of Craigmiles
and the decision reached by the 6th Circuit for purposes of comparison.

Part V analyzes the unfortunate holding of the 10th Circuit in Powers
and discusses how the Supreme Court can handle the case more appro-

priately.
I. THE CURRENT

STATE OF ECONOMIC LIBERTIES

The plaintiffs in Powers, operators of an online retail casket business, challenged an Oklahoma law requiring that most intrastate casket
sales be made only by licensed funeral directors. 13 The plaintiffs argued
that the law violated the Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 The current
jurisprudential state of each clause will be discussed in turn.
8.

Jessica E. Hacker. The Return to Lochnerism? The Revival of Economic Libertiesfrom

David to Goliath,52 DEPAUL L. REV. 675, 675 (2002).
9. 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cit. 2004).
10.
See generally Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (approving of the casket
monopoly by declaring naked economic protectionism to be a legitimate state interest). However,
the Supreme Court has never declared that governments can permissibly grant monopolies without

an underlying public purpose.
11.

Id. at 1225.

12.
13.

312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1211.

14.

Id. at 1214; U.S CONST. amend. XIV.
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The vague Privileges or Immunities clause has been difficult to in-6
5I
However, the Slaughter House Cases'
terpret since its inception.
greatly restricted whatever substantive meaning the clause was meant to
have.' 7 In the Slaughter House Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
Louisiana law giving slaughter houses a 25 year monopoly.' 8 In doing
so, the majority "virtually eradicated the clause by determining that it9
was not a tool to protect state citizens from their own state actions."'
However, in the recent Saenz v. Roe2 0 decision, the Court relied on the
Privileges or Immunities clause to invalidate a durational residency requirement for California welfare benefits. 2' Thus, the Court "restored
the possibility of practical weight to the Privileges or Immunities clause
for the first time in 130 years." 22 Even Justice Thomas in his dissenting
opinion expressed a willingness to reexamine the meaning of the clause
and apply it along with or instead of an Equal Protection or substantive
Due Process analysis in certain cases.23 However, lower courts have not
used this clause to review the constitutionality of state economic regulations. 24
With the demise of the Privileges or Immunities clause, plaintiffs
have sought to protect their economic rights through the substantive element of the Due Process clause.25 The degree of protection against state
limitations of economic liberties has varied widely throughout our nation's history.26 In the infamous 1905 case Lochner v. New York, 2 7 the
Supreme Court found a state law limiting the number of hours that bakers could work per week unconstitutional.28 The Court found "liberty to
contract" to be a fundamental right and applied a strict scrutiny standard
of review, holding that the law violated substantive Due Process. 29 In the
years following Lochner, the Court invalidated hundreds of state laws.3 °
This era could be seen as the high-water mark for Fourteenth31 Amendment substantive Due Process protection of economic liberties.

15.
16.
17.

See Hacker, supra note 8, at 680.
86 U.S. 36 (1872).
See id.

18.

See id.

19.

Hacker, supra note 8, at 681.

20.

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
(5th ed.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See id.
Hacker, supra note 8, at 676.
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 528 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See Powers, 379 F.3d. at 1214; see also Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
Hacker, supra note 8, at 677.
See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 486-513
2004).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45-46, 64-65.
Id. at 53-54.
Hacker, supra note 8, at 685.
See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 26.
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However, in the wake of the Great Depression, the Court reversed
its position in Nebbia v. New York. 32 In this case, the Court upheld a
New York law fixing milk prices, reasoning that the prices were fixed in
the interest of the public.33 This case broke with Lochner in the standard
of review used in evaluating state economic regulations.34 Instead of
reviewing the economic regulations with strict scrutiny, the Court applied a rational basis test-a test that is highly deferential to the state
legislature. 35 The Nebbia Court describes this standard as follows: "If
laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of
due process are [satisfied]." 36 This abandonment of stare decisis had the
effect of the Court upholding many state economic regulations with little
to no consideration. 37 Although this rational basis test is highly deferential, the Supreme Court has occasionally used the standard to strike down
state laws. 38 Thus, the rational basis test still has "some bite, ' ' 39 and the

standard of review is not "toothless," as recognized by numerous courts,
including the Tenth Circuit in Martin v. Bergland.40
Certain cases outline how the test is supposed to be used. "When a
statute regulates certain 'fundamental rights' (e.g. voting or abortion) or
distinguishes between people on the basis of certain "suspect characteristics (e.g. race or national origin), the statute is subject to 'strict scrutiny.-' 41 Under Romer v. Evans, 42 the Court "will uphold a law that neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class so long as the
legislative classification bears a rational relation to some independent
and legitimate legislative end."4 3 When applying the test, legislation is
strongly presumed to be valid and will be upheld "if there is any rea44
sonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis."
A plaintiff who wants to strike down a piece of state legislation using the
rational basis test has the burden to "negative every conceivable basis
that might support it." 45 However, the courts insist on knowing the rela-

32.
33.

291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 502 (1934).

34.
35.

Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 502.
Id.

36.

Id.

37.

Hacker, supra note 8, at 687.

38.
39.
40.

Simpson, supra note 4, at 189.
Id.
639 F.2d 647, 650 (10th Cir. 1981) (rejecting assertion that "no amount of evidence"

could overcome the strong presumption of validity afforded to state legislation under rational basis

review).
41.

Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 2002).

42.
43.
44.
45.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 621.
Craigmiles,312 F.3d at 224 (quoting Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 668 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Id. (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973)).
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tion between
the means and end sought to be attained by a piece of legis46
lation.
Equal Protection jurisprudence closely parallels that of substantive
due process. 47 In fact, the Craigmiles Court used the same analysis to
find the legislation unconstitutional under both clauses.4 8 Generally, it is
well settled that the rational basis test is the applicable standard of review
for both substantive Due Process and Equal Protection claims.49 However, the Equal Protection clause protects a different aspect of personal
liberties than that which is protected by the substantive aspect of the Due
Process clause. While the Due Process clause is concerned with violations of rights that affect persons equally, the Equal Protection clause
prevents state governments from enacting legislation that arbitrarily
treats similar groups differently or arbitrarily treats different groups the
same. 50 In fact, the Supreme Court has held that "[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though
they were exactly alike ... . If such state legislation is to be constitutional, there must be some "plausible connection between the distinction
and a legitimate public purpose. 52 The Court in Powers decided to address the plaintiffs' claims in an Equal Protection discussion, but recognized that the "substantive due process analysis proceeds along the same
lines as an equal protection analysis ....
IlI. POWERS V. HARRIS
A. Facts

Under Oklahoma law, the funeral industry is regulated by the Oklahoma Funeral Services Licensing Act ("FSLA") and the Board it created. 4 The FSLA stipulates that any person engaged in selling caskets
must be a licensed funeral director operating out of a funeral establishment This restriction is not applied to people engaged in selling other
funeral-related merchandise, including urns. 56 This strict regulation is
only applied to "time-of-need" casket sales (when the person for whom
46.
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
47.
Anthony B. Sanders, Exhumation Through Burial: How Challenging Casket Regulations
Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L. REV. 668,

674 (2002).
48. See generally Craigmiles,312 F.3d at 223-30 (describing the standard of review to be the
same under both clauses and evaluating the claims under both clauses simultaneously).
49.
Sanders, supra note 47, at 674.

50.

See Opening Brief for Appellant at 59, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004)

(No. 03-6014).

51.
52.

Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1690; see also Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539

U.S. 103 (2003).
53.
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1215.

54.
55.
56.

OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 395.1-396.28 (2004).
Id.
Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2004).
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the casket is for is already dead). 7 A license is not necessary to sell
"pre-need" caskets, but the salesperson must be acting as the agent of a
fully licensed funeral director.58 In fact, plaintiff Kim Powers engaged in
the "pre-need" sale of thousands of caskets as the agent of various funeral homes. 59 Also, the licensing requirement only applied to the intrastate sale of caskets. 60 Thus, no license is required for an Oklahoman to
sell a casket to a customer outside of the state, nor is a license required
for an out-of-state salesman to sell a casket to customer located in Oklahoma. If the law were to apply to interstate casket sales, it almost certainly would be held unconstitutional under the dormant commerce
clause. 6 1
Becoming a licensed funeral director in Oklahoma is not an easy
task. "According to the Board's rules, an applicant for a funeral director's license must complete both sixty credit hours of specified undergraduate training and a one-year apprenticeship during which the applicant must embalm twenty-five bodies." 62 Also, applicants are required to
pass two exams, one dealing with Oklahoma law.63 Additionally, to gain
a license, a business must meet certain specific requirements, including,
"a fixed physical location, a preparation room that meets the requirements for embalming bodies, a funeral-service merchandise-selection
room with an inventory of not less than five caskets, and adequate areas
for public viewing of human remains. ' '64 Essentially, to sell caskets in
Oklahoma a person has to jump through numerous hoops entirely unrelated to the sale of caskets. In fact, the district court found that "very
little specialized knowledge is required to sell caskets. 65
The plaintiffs, Kim Powers and Dennis Bridges, desired to sell
"time-of-need" caskets intrastate in Oklahoma over the internet. 66 They
are not licensed under the FSLA and "have no desire to obtain the appropriate Oklahoma licenses because they view their requirements as irrelevant to the operation of an intrastate, Internet, retail, casket business. -,67
In order to lawfully engage in their chosen business, the Plaintiffs would
have to "spend years of their lives equipping themselves with knowledge
57.
58.

Powers, 379 F.3d at 1212.
Id.

59. Opening Brief for Appellant at 11, Powers v. Harris 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-6014).
60. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1212 (emphasis added).
61.
See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (reasoning that for
dormant commerce clause review, "where simple economic protectionism is effected by a state
legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected"). Incidentally, the CraigmilesCourt

applies this same reasoning to their substantive due process/equal protection analysis. Craigmiles v.
Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002).
62. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1212.
63.

Id.

64.

Id. at 1212-13.

65.
66.
67.

Id. at 1213.
Id.
Id.
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and training which is not directly relevant to selling caskets. 68 The
Plaintiffs do not provide any funeral services or offer any other funeralrelated products. 69 However, they have refrained from making these
kinds of sales because they "have a reasonable and genuine fear that if
they were to sell caskets to Oklahoma consumers, they might be prosecuted for violation of the FSLA and Board rules. 70 The Plaintiffs
brought suit in federal district court "asserting that the FSLA violates the
Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.'
B. Decision

The Powers Court quickly dealt with the Privileges or Immunities
clause claim by relying on the Slaughter-House Cases, reasoning that it
was not its place to overrule them.72 The court then turned to evaluate the
merits of the equal protection claim. The court correctly identified the
"rational basis test" as the proper tool for its analysis.7 3 The rational
basis test, as applied in the equal protection context, essentially has two
elements: a law's disparate treatment of two similar groups, or similar
treatment of different groups, must serve a legitimate government purpose; and any such distinction must be rationally related (albeit minimally) to that legitimate government purpose.74 The defendant Board

argued that the interest served by the FSLA was consumer protection
because casket purchasers were a "particularly vulnerable group."75 The
defendant Board initially also proffered the argument that the licensure
requirement advanced public health, but abandoned this argument before
trial.76
The Powers Court then discussed whether the FSLA was rationally
related to serving the government interest of consumer protection.77 The
Plaintiffs presented strong evidence that the FSLA's licensing scheme
was not rationally related to furthering the legitimate government interest
of consumer protection. 78 The Board did not even argue that the provi68.
69.

Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1213.

70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 1214.

72.

Id.

73.

Id.at 1215.

74. Id.
75.
Id.
76. Opening Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-6014).
77.
78.

Powers, 379 F.3d at 1215.
Id. ("Less than five per cent of the education and training requirements necessary for

licensure in Oklahoma pertain directly to any knowledge or skills necessary to sell caskets."); see
also Opening Brief for Appellant at 36-37, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-6014) (arguing that a casket is not a "complex piece of equipment," and that "everything one
needs to know about purchasing a casket can be conveyed in just a few minutes;" also pointing out
that plaintiff Kim Powers successfully sold caskets on a pre-need basis to grieving individuals (for
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rather, it merely
sions of the FSLA were relevant to consumer protection;
79
suggested that they were not "wholly irrelevant.,
Because of the radical reasoning of the majority, whether the licensing scheme was rationally related to the goal of consumer protection
effectively became a moot point. The court decided that the state interest
being sought by the FSLA could actually be "protecting the intrastate
funeral home industry." 80 Ironically, this is exactly what the plaintiffs
had attempted to demonstrate.8s The court then declared that intrastate
economic protectionism, even in the absence of any public value, constituted a legitimate state purpose.82 Because the licensure requirement was
rationally related to protecting funeral directors by giving them a virtual
monopoly on casket sales, the legislation was deemed valid.83 Thus, the
court allowed Oklahoma to treat casket retailers differently than retailers
of other similar products (as well as treating the very different professions of casket salesmen and funeral directors exactly the same) because
the legislation was in furtherance of a legitimate public purpose and rationally related to that purpose. 84 The court then discussed the differences between85their reasoning and that of the Sixth Circuit case Craigmiles v. Giles.

IV. CRAIGMILES V. GILES

86

A. Facts

Craigmiles v. Giles is a U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case
with a virtually identical fact pattern to that of Powers. Similar to Oklahoma's law at issue in Powers, the Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act ("FDEA") forbade persons from selling caskets unless they
were a licensed funeral director.87 Also similar to Oklahoma's law, be
coming a licensed funeral director required a two year time commitment.88 An applicant could "complete either one year of course work at
an accredited mortuary school and then a one-year apprenticeship with a
licensed funeral director or a two-year apprenticeship. ' 89 After this period of time, 9the applicant is required to pass the Tennessee Funeral Arts
Examination. " The district court found that "no more than five percent"
many of whom the death of a loved one was imminent) for years without any mortuary education or
grief psychology training).

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1218.
Id.
Id. at 1222.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1223-24.
312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
Craigmiles,312 F.3d at 222.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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of the curriculum at the only accredited funeral director school related to
the sale of caskets. 9 1

The plaintiffs operated independent casket stores in Chattanooga
and Knoxville. Although the stores did sell other funeral merchandise,
they "engage[d] in no embalming or arranging of funeral services, cremations, or burials." 92 Both of the plaintiffs' stores only engaged in
"time-of-need" sales, "after the death of the intended occupant. ' 9 The
Tennessee Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers ("FDEA") then
issued a cease and desist order, which banned the plaintiffs from continuing their business of selling caskets because they were not licensed funeral directors. 94 When the plaintiffs brought suit, the district court
found that the FDEA, as it applied to the plaintiffs' businesses, violated
their rights under both the Equal Protection and substantive Due Process
clause. 95 However, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
96
law also was invalid under the Privileges or Immunities clause.
B. Decision

The initial reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in examining the states'
appeal mirrors that of the Tenth Circuit in Powers. However, the court
considered the constitutionality of the law under both the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses simultaneously. 97 The court here also correctly identified the rational basis test as the proper standard of review,
"requiring only that the regulation bear some rational relation to a legitimate state interest., 98 The court then went on to discuss the wide deference given to state legislatures under such a test. "Even foolish and misdirected provisions are generally valid if subject only to rational basis
review. ' 99 The court made it clear that "protecting a discrete interest
group from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose."'1 This is the essential difference in the reasoning between Powers and Craigmiles. Once the court decided that protecting the economic
interests of licensed funeral directors was not a legitimate government
purpose, the Court looked to see whether the FDEA was rationally related to any other legitimate government purpose.'0 ' Unlike, the defendants in Powers, Tennessee proffered two explanations for the legitimate

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.
Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)).
Id. at 223-24.

100.

Id. at 224.

101.

Id. at 225.
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government interest being served, claiming the licensure requirement
safety. 02
advanced both consumer protection and public health and
The Sixth Circuit was not persuaded by either of these explanations.
While recognizing that the quality of a casket could potentially affect
public health, the court reasoned that the law "does not require that any
0 3 Also,
particular type of casket, or any casket at all, be used at burial."'
there was no evidence that caskets sold by licensed funeral directors
were any more protective than those sold by unlicensed casket salesman:
The only difference was that caskets sold by licensed funeral directors
were "systematically more expensive."'104 Thus, the licensing requirement may actually reduce the quality of caskets being used because of
the artificially high prices it creates. 05s The court of appeals, like the
district court, was not convinced that poor quality caskets posed any
health risk whatsoever, but reasoned, "even if casket selection has an
effect on public health and safety, restricting the retailing of caskets to
directors bears no rational relationship to managing that
licensed 0funeral
6
effect." 1
The Court next analyzed whether the licensing requirement was rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of consumer protection. Tennessee argued that because the FDEA regulates the conduct
of funeral directors, consumers are protected from salesman "making
fraudulent misrepresentations, making solicitations after death or when
death is imminent, or selling a previously used casket." 10 7 The court
countered this argument in several ways. First, the court reasoned that
civil and criminal sanctions are available to govern the conduct of casket
salesmen even without the FDEA. 10 8 The court also reasoned that the
"legislature could develop similar standards for casket retailers, or even
make Section 317 [of the FDEA (which prevents funeral directors from
making fraudulent representations)] directly applicable to casket retail19
ers, without requiring the licensure that is the subject of complaint."'
The court recognized that the legislature "could.. . have addressed the
interest of consumer protection without imposing a prohibitive cost" in
the form of two years of unnecessary training."10
The state also argued that "the course of study required for licensure
trains directors in the best ways to treat individuals who have suffered
profound loss...1 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that indi102.
103.
104.

Id,
Id.
id.at 226.

105.

Id.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sanders, supra note 47, at 684; Craigmiles,312 F.3d at 227-28,

111.

Craigmiles,312 F.3d at 288.

POWERS V. HARRIS

20051

viduals purchasing a casket from an independent retailer will still require
the services of a licensed funeral director and many other vendors are
dealt with by survivors, none of whom are required to have such training.112

After finding "no rational relationship to any of the articulated purposes of the state," the Court explicitly examined "the more obvious ille'1 13
gitimate purpose to which licensure provision is very well tailored."
The Courts finds this purpose to be imposing a "significant barrier to
competition in the casket market." 14 Finally, the Court recognized that
"invalidation of economic regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment
has been rare in the modem era," but emphasized that its' decision was
"not a return to Lochner, by which this court would elevate its economic
theory over that of legislative bodies."'1 15 Because the law failed to meet
the even minimal requirements of the rational basis test, Justice Boggs
and the Sixth Circuit found Tennessee's licensing requirement to sell
time-of-need caskets intrastate to be unconstitutional as violating both
the plaintiffs' equal protection and substantive due process rights under
116
the Fourteenth Amendment.
V.

ANALYSIS

In Powers, the Tenth Circuit upheld an Oklahoma law limiting the
sale of caskets to licensed funeral directors despite plaintiffs' challenges
that the law violated their rights under the Privileges or Immunities and
Equal Protection clauses, and the substantive element of the Due Process
clause. 117 By doing so, the Tenth Circuit failed to protect the economic
liberties of its citizens.
First, this comment will briefly examine the wisdom of using a
highly deferential standard of review when protecting individuals' economic rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. Second, this comment will discuss whether the court could have invalidated
the Oklahoma law by relying on the Privileges or Immunities clause,
which was intended to protect an individual's right to earn an honest
living, and has been recently revived by the Supreme Court. Third, this
comment primarily argues that the Tenth Circuit wrongly found naked
economic protectionism to be a legitimate government interest for the
purpose of rational basis review. This dangerous and radical holding
could have drastic implications for the future of economic liberty and is
not supported by past precedent. Fourth, this comment argues that the
Tenth Circuit also failed to consider the arbitrary nature of the licensure
112.

Id.

113.
114.

Id.
Id.

115.
116.

Id. at 229.
Id. at 228-29.

117.

Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).
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requirement. After determining that protecting the intrastate funeral industry is not a legitimate government interest, the Tenth Circuit should
have invalidated the state law using the highly deferential rational basis
test. Finally, this comment discusses the likely future of Powers v. Harris.
A. Do Economic Rights Deserve GreaterProtection?

Although the framers intended the courts to be a significant check
on legislative power, they have largely been absent in the arena of economic rights for much of this century.' 1 8 The Court now distinguishes
between "certain fundamental rights and liberty interests" and economic
9
liberties, the latter of which are less protected.'1 Why should this be the
case? Are economic rights, specifically, the right to earn an honest living
free from government interference, less important to citizens of this
country than other rights? In fact, "there is little justification for eliminating the use of substantive due process for challenges to economic
while retaining its use in areas concerning personal liberregulations
1 20
ties.,
Modern constitutional jurisprudence makes it extremely difficult for
a court to overturn an economic regulation because of the highly deferential rational basis test.' 2' This gives the state legislatures much leeway to
control the economic affairs of their citizens. Thus, state regulatory
powers are at an all time high. 122 Not surprisingly, interest groups now
have great influence in legislation.123 Individuals and corporations "often
must pit their economic survival against state regulations seeking to limit
or prohibit their rights.' 24 Thus, it may be time to reexamine the importance of economic liberties and the role of the courts in protecting
active government requires an active juthem. 25 After all, "a large and 126
diciary to counter its excesses."'
What would be so wrong with the courts taking a cautious step towards returning to the reasoning of Lochner and elevating the status of
economic rights? Even three of the four dissenting justices in Lochner
"accepted that a liberty to contract could be found in the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 127 The only, real debate in Lochner was the amount of

118.
119.
(1997)).

Simpson, supra note 4, at 177.
Sanders, supra note 47, at 672 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720

120.

Hacker, supra note 8, at 735.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Simpson, supranote 4, at 177.
See id. at 176.
Id. at 176-77.
Hacker, supra note 8, at 675.
See Simpson, supra note 4, at 177.

126.
127.

Id.
Hacker, supra note 8, at 685.
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deference given to the state legislatures. 128 This "liberty to contract"
which the Court relied on was only removed in the face of a national
crisis, the Great Depression. 129 Now that this country is in a period of
general economic stability, maybe the time is ripe for the Supreme Court
to reevaluate the importance and historical significance of economic
rights and the protection offered to them by the Fourteenth Amendment.
After Nebbia, the Court "moved from the extreme of near per se invalidation of economic regulation to the opposite extreme of near per se
validation." 130 This overzealous elimination of economic substantive due
31
process should be reexamined. 1
Such consideration would be consistent with the recent elevation of
the right of privacy, illustrated in the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade. 132
In this case the Supreme Court effectively invalidated anti-abortion laws
by finding privacy to be a fundamental right protected by the substantive
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 33 If privacy can be
characterized as a fundamental right, then could not the right to earn an
honest living also be characterized as fundamental? Affording economic
rights such a status would allow courts to apply a stricter standard of
review when confronted with restrictions like the licensure requirement
in Powers, making their decision to invalidate such needless laws even
easier. However, this comment argues that such an expanded judicial
role in evaluating economic regulations is not necessary to invalidate the
law upheld by the Tenth Circuit in Powers.
B. Does the Privilegesor Immunities Clause Provide Protectionfor the
Plaintiffs?

Could the Tenth Circuit have relied on the Privileges or Immunities
clause to invalidate the Oklahoma licensure requirement? The court correctly noted that "it is [the Supreme] Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents."' 134 It is not the place of the Tenth Circuit to
essentially overrule The Slaughterhouse Cases.'35 Even the Craigmiles
Court thought it would be beyond its authority to "breathe new life into
the Privileges or Immunities Clause."' 136 However, the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment, accompanied with the Supreme Court's recent
128.
See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The dissent in Lochner accepted that a liberty to contract could be found in the Constitution. However, the dissent would have
upheld the law, which restricted the number of hours bakers could work per day, because it had a
"real and substantial" relation to the protection of health." Id. at 69. The use of the word "substantial" implies an intermediate standard of review, more exacting than the current minimum rationality
standard.
129.
See Hacker, supra note 8, at 685.
130.
Id. at 730.
131.
Id.

132.
133.

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.

134.
135.

Powers, 379 F.3d at 1214 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
See id.

136.

Id. at 698 (quoting Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 228 (6th Cir. 2002)).
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decision in Saenz v. Roe, merits discussion of whether the clause does in
fact provide protection for the plaintiffs in Powers.
The Privileges or Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
clause. 137
was modeled after the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
The difference between the two clauses is that while the Privileges and
Immunities clause protects residents of one state against the action of
another state government, the Privileges or Immunities clause was enacted to protect U.S. citizens against state action, including action taken
by their own state government. 38 The plaintiffs claim that "[t]he Privileges or Immunities Clause clearly protects Americans against their
home state's legislative power when that state's power is exercised in139a
citizenship."
manner that abridges a privilege or immunity of national
Furthermore, since the Article IV provision undisputedly provides protection for the right to earn an honest living, it can be assumed that the
14°
Fourteenth Amendment also protects such a right. At least one of the
framers of the clause included within its' scope "the liberty.., to work
in an honest calling and contribute by your toil in some sort to yourself,
to the support of your fellowmen, and to be secure in the enjoyment of
the fruits of your toil.' ' 141 Because the right to earn an honest living
or
stems from U.S. citizenship and not state citizenship, the Privileges
liberties.142
Immunities clause should afford protection to economic
The Supreme Court recently showed an interest in reviving the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as it applies to citizens' economic
rights. 143 Saenz signified an important step in reviving the Privileges or
Immunities clause. 144 The Court held that "the Privileges or Immunities
Clause protected citizens' rights to be treated like other state citizens in
the state to which they move, the Court relied on the unenumerated right
to travel.' 45 Even in his dissent, Justice Thomas expressed an openness
to reexamine the meaning of the clause in an appropriate case, using it
either in addition to or instead of an equal protection or due process
analysis.' 46 At the very least, the Supreme Court's decision in Saenz,
combined with historical background, raises the question of whether
economic liberties are protected by the Privileges or Immunities clause

137.
03-6014).
138.
139.
140.

Opening Brief for Appellant at 63, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.

141.

Id. at 64 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1871) (statement of Rep.

Id. at 64 n.18.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 63-64.

Bingham)).
142.

Id. at 65.

143. See generally Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (invalidating a durational residency
requirement for welfare benefits by relying on the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
144. See Hacker, supra note 8,at 693-94.
145.
146.

Id. at 695.
Id. at 696.
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and whether that protection would47include a more exacting standard of
review than the rational basis test. 1
The plaintiffs' argument that the Privileges or Immunities clause
protects their right to earn an honest living may not square with existing
Supreme Court precedent. 148 However, the plaintiffs are correct in the
assertion that the Privileges or Immunities clause should protect this
right. After all, in our capitalist society, what could be more important to
an individual than the right to engage in honest trade to support oneself
and one's family? Surely the vast majority of Americans would agree
that the freedom to choose a lawful occupation is fundamental to their
happiness and survival. Moreover, a more expansive reading of the
Privileges or Immunities clause would be beneficial from a legal standpoint because it would relieve courts' excessive reliance on the Equal
Protection and substantive Due Process clauses to support economic and
individual rights. 149 When reviewing this or a similar case, the Supreme
Court should consider expanding the scope of the protection offered by
the clause.
C. Naked Economic Protectionismis NOT a Legitimate Government
Interest

The Powers decision split from the Sixth Circuit decision in Craigmiles and wrongly upheld an irrational state law that served no legitimate
government purpose. By doing so, the court not only failed to protect the
economic liberties of Oklahoma citizens, but also blatantly misstated the
law. In order to invalidate the Oklahoma licensing scheme, which the
Court itself recognizes as a "needless, wasteful requirement,' ' 50 the
Tenth Circuit would not have to take what could be interpreted as extreme measures in reviving the Privileges and Immunities clause or elevating the status of economic rights. Invalidating the Oklahoma law as
either violating Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process or equal
protection would not be tantamount to a return to Lochner. All the Tenth
Circuit had to do to strike down the law was adequately apply the current
"minimum rationality" standard of review to the given fact situation.
State legislation "is generally upheld under an economic due process analysis if it furthers a permissible police power end."' 5' Protecting
the "general welfare" is a permissible police power end. 52 What constitutes general welfare? One thing is clear: Purely private interest legisla-

147.

Reply Brief for Appellant at 22-23, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004)

(No. 03-6014).
148.
149.

Slaughter House Cases, 86 U.S. 36 (1872).
Hacker, supra note 8, at 713.

150.
151.
152.

Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225.
Hacker, supra note 8, at 733.
Id.
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153 This type of legislation
tion does not protect the general welfare.
from another group because of a
treats one group of people differently
"raw exercise of political power."'' 5 4 Such exercises of power are prohibited by our constitution. 155 "Economic redistributions that do not increase community welfare, help a disadvantaged group or those harmed
or promote public health or safety are genby "natural or market forces,"
' 56
erally impermissible."'

No Supreme Court case supports the proposition that naked economic protectionism, without even the guise of furthering the general
1 57
Not only has
welfare of the state, is a legitimate government interest.
virtually every court confronted with a similar licensing requirement for
casket salespersons invalidated the law, 58 none of them have even entertained the idea that protecting the interests of funeral directors, by itself,
159
The defendants themconstituted a legitimate government interest.
selves did not even argue such a justification for the law, and instead
6° The plainconcocted the far-fetched consumer protection rationale.
tiffs also lacked the foresight (albeit understandably) to demonstrate in
their arguments why pure economic protectionism is not a legitimate
government purpose.16
In fact, even the concurring opinion in Powers recognized that "all
of the cases rest on a fundamental foundation: The discriminatory
legislation arguably advances either the general welfare or a public interest."1 62 Thus, the Powers Court actually engaged in radical judicial rea-

soning in concluding that the Oklahoma legislature could benefit funeral
directors by giving them a virtual monopoly on the sale of caskets without any public interest being served. And let there be no doubt that the
funeral directors did benefit from their effective monopoly, at the expense of consumers. Funeral directors in Oklahoma routinely marked up
casket prices 300-600%. 163 Even the defendants' own expert witness
testified that he had never seen a markup of greater than 300% outside of

153.
154.

See id. at 734.
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1693.

155.

Id. at 1697.

156.
157.
158.

Hacker, supra note 8,at 734.
See Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
Opening brief for Appellant at 26, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.

03 -6014).
159. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), affd, 312 F.3d 220 (6th
Cir. 2002); Casket Royale, Inc. v. Mississippi, 124 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D. Miss. 2000).
160. See generally Powers, 379 F.3d 1208. The defendants did not proffer the argument that
the protection of funeral directors, by itself, could be a legitimate state interest. The 10th Circuit
devised this rationale on its own.

Opening brief for Appellant at 26, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
161.
03-6014).
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225.
162.
Opening brief for Appellant at 14, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
163.
03-6014).
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Oklahoma. 164 The complete deference to the legislature embodied in the
Powers holding puts a stamp of approval on all intrastate private interest
legislation, and allows state governments to openly do favors for special
interests and friends. This effectively removes all meaning from the term
"legitimate." Could a majority now pass a law enjoining a certain individual or group from participating in a business for any reason at all?
Could the legislature now give an individual or group a monopoly for
any reason at all? This is what the Powers majority is apparently authorizing.
The Powers reasoning blatantly conflicts with the ideas of the framers of the Constitution. "That Madison included economic liberty within
the rights of individuals is clear from his views on how governments
often abuse rights."' 65 To Madison, a prime example of an unjust government exists "where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies
deny to part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice
of their occupations."' 66 The Oklahoma law at issue in Powers is exactly
the type of arbitrary restriction Madison was referring to. Fortunately for
proponents of economic liberties, courts need not look all the way back
to the Federalist Papers to invalidate such legislation.
Case law precedent directly conflicts with the Powers holding. The
Sixth Circuit recognized this in Craigmilesand declared that "protecting
a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate
government purpose.' ' 167 In fact, this proposition was so obvious to the
Craigmiles Court that they spent little time defending it.' 68 To support
the proposition, the court cites City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,169
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 170 and Energy Reserves Group, Inc.

v. Kansas Power.171 The Powers Court rejected these cases as applicable
precedents because they dealt with state regulations of interstate commerce and not intrastatecommerce. 172 Because the licensing scheme in
Powers did not apply to casket sales across state borders (interstate, i.e.
someone in Oklahoma buying a casket from or selling a casket to someone outside of Oklahoma), it was acceptable. 173 What the Court failed to
recognize was that these cases give no indication that the definition of a
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Simpson, supra note 4, at 181.
Id.

167.

Craigmiles,312 F.3d at 224.

168. See id.
169. 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (finding a New Jersey law banning waste from entering the state to
be protectionist and unconstitutional).
170. 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (finding the application of a New York licensing statute for milk
processing receiving facilities to be protectionist and unconstitutional).
171. 459 U.S. 400 (1983) (finding that the Kansas Natural Gas Protection Act, which permitted
increases in gas prices under contractual escalator clauses was constitutional because regulation of
the natural gas industry was directed at protecting consumers and the Act was rationally related to
that goal).
172.
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1218.
173. See id.
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"legitimate state purpose" should be different under a "dormant" commerce clause analysis than under an equal protection/substantive due
process analysis. 174 The City of PhiladelphiaCourt simply stated: "Thus,
where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a
' 75 Also, at least
virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected."'
some constitutional scholars find that the tests involved in a dormant
commerce clause analysis should be virtually the same as the test in an
equal protection analysis. 176
Moreover, as a practical matter, what sense does it make to allow a
state to treat its own citizens worse than citizens of other states? Should
protection offered by the dormant commerce clause be greater than the
protection clearly articulatedin the Fourteenth Amendment? The law in
Powers effectively gives Oklahoma residents seeking to sell caskets to
other Oklahoma residents two options: Either become a licensed funeral
by complying with all the licensure requirements, or simply move their
place of business just across the Oklahoma border where they could lawfully sell caskets interstatein Oklahoma. This "loophole" illustrates the
arbitrariness of the law's distinctions.
Although they are not wholly irrelevant, it is entirely unnecessary to
use "dormant commerce clause" cases to determine what constitutes a
legitimate state purpose for equal protection and substantive due process
claims. They may not invalidate state laws, but every substantive due
of general welfare
process and equal protection case identifies some sort
177
protectionism.
economic
mere
state interest beyond
The Powers Court misinterpreted some of these cases when relying
78
on Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,' Fitzgeraldv. Racing Asso180
Not
ciation of Central Iowa, 179 and City of New Orleans v. Dukes.
them
of
none
but
facts,
their
on
only can these cases be differentiated
stand for the proposition that the court raises: That naked economic protectionism is a legitimate state purpose.
First of all, in Fitzgerald,the Court seems to hint that when tax levels are at issue, an even more deferential standard of review is applied
than the usual rational basis standard. 181 The Court also did not phrase
174.

E.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); H.P Hood & Sons, Inc. v.

Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power, 459 U.S. 400
(1983).
City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624.
175.
Sunstein, supra note 2, at 1689-90.
176.
See generally Williamson, 348 U.S. 483 (reasoning the law advanced public health); see
177.
generally Fitzgerald,539 U.S. 103 (reasoning the law could have been enacted to encourage riverboat communities); see generally Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (reasoning the law could have been enacted

to protect the appearance and custom valued by city residents).
178. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
179. 539 U.S. 103 (2003).
180. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 107 (2003).
181.
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the issue as whether the legislature could favor one gambling industry
over another without justification. The Court reasoned that "the legislators may have wanted to encourage the economic development of river
communities or to promote riverboat history, say, by providing incentives for riverboats to remain in the State, rather than relocate to other
States."'' 8 2 The Court also speculated that the legislation might be protecting the "reliance interests of riverboat operators."'' 8 3 These rationales
show that the Court is searching for a legitimate policy purpose beyond
arbitrary economic protectionism. Encouraging economic development
and promoting riverboat history certainly relate to the general welfare of
the state.
In Williamson, the Plaintiffs challenged a law making it "unlawful
for any person not a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit lenses
to a face or to duplicate or replace into frames lenses or other optical
appliances, except upon written prescriptive authority of an Oklahoma
licensed ophthalmologist or optometrist."' 184 The Court upheld the legislation against a Fourteenth Amendment constitutional challenge.' 8 5
However, implicit in the Court's reasoning was that the restriction was
rationally related to the legitimate state interest of public health: 186
An eyeglass frame, considered in isolation, is only a piece of merchandise. But an eyeglass frame is not used in isolation.., it is used
with lenses; and lenses, pertaining as they do to the human eye, enter
the field of health. Therefore, the legislature might conclude that to
187
regulate one effectively it would have to regulate the other.

Thus, the Supreme Court requires that some public value be invoked in order to legitimize a piece of state legislation. 88 Judge
Tymkovich recognized this in his Powers concurrence, stating, "[r]ather
than hold that a government may always favor one economic actor over
another, the Court,
if anything, insisted that the legislation advance some
189

public good."'

Dukes involved legislation banning street vendors from selling
foodstuffs out of pushcarts in a certain area of New Orleans unless they
had been operating there for a specified period of time. 190 The Court
found that the legislation rationally furthered the legitimate state interest
of preserving "the appearance and custom valued by the Quarter's resi-

182.

Id. at 109.

183.

Id.

184.
185.
186.

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S 483, 485 (1955).
Williamson, 348 U.S. at 490.
See id.
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Id.
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Sunstein, supranote 2, 1713.
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
Dukes, 427 U.S. at 297.
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dents and attractive to tourists."' 191 The Court did not hold that legislation could simply favor long-term vendors over short term vendors without an overriding public purpose. 192 On the contrary, the Court described
invalid legislation to be "the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment." 93 What could the Court possibly be referring to in this statement,
if not a licensing requirement that could plausibly advance no other state
interest than the mere economic protection of funeral directors?
The Court went on to defend the difference in treatment as a gradual
approach to limiting street vendors and reasoned that the city could have
reasonably been concerned about the reliance interest of the older vendors. 194 Again, this reasoning used by the Court here does not lend support to the Powers holding that "intra-state economic protectionism... is
a legitimate government interest."' 195 Of course, the argument could be
made that upholding the licensing requirements in Oklahoma would further the reliance interests of funeral directors who have always enjoyed a
monopoly on casket sales. However, none of the cases discussed lend
any credibility to the assertion that a piece of legislation can be justified
on a reliance interest alone.' 96 Moreover, there is no gradual opening of
the intrastate casket market over time, nor is there evidence that funeral
directors in Oklahoma enjoyed a monopoly on the sale of caskets prior to
1989.197 Also, neither the defendant Board nor the Tenth Circuit relied
on such reasoning.
Even the concurring opinion in Powers agrees that economic protectionism alone, without any other legitimate government interest, is not
a legitimate state interest. 198 After examining Williamson, Dukes, and
Fitzgerald,Judge Tymkovich reasoned "the majority, in contrast to these
precedents, effectively imports a standard that could even credit legisla99
If economic
tive classifications that advance no general state interest."'
would
justification
what
then
interest,
state
a
legitimate
is
protectionism
purpose
principled
be
some
must
There
legitimate?
considered
be
not
behind a government action that (at least in theory) relates to the overall
good of the society.

Id. at 304.
191.
See id.
192.
Id. at 303-04.
193.
Id. at 304-05.
194.
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1222.
195.
See generally Wiliamson, 348 U.S. 483 (reasoning the law advanced public health); see
196.
generally Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. 103 (reasoning the law could have been enacted to encourage riverboat communities); see generally Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (reasoning the law could have been enacted
to protect the appearance and custom valued by city residents).
Opening Brief for Appellant, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03197.
6014).
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1226 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
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Requiring a legitimate state interest that somehow relates to a public
value or benefit is not only consistent with past precedent-it also makes
sense. Requiring a public value ends to justify legislation protects
against the power of factions that worried Thomas Jefferson. 200 Requiring something more than a naked economic preference to validate a piece
of legislation helps to ensure that state government action truly promotes
the public welfare, and prevents interest groups from exercising raw political power. 201 "Moreover, it reflects the notion that the role of government is not to implement or trade off preexisting private interests, but
to select public values., 20 2 A return to Lochner is entirely unnecessary to
support such a proposition. In fact, "the minimum requirement that government decisions be something other than a raw exercise of political
power has been embodied in constitutional doctrine under the due proc' 203
ess clause before, during, and after the Lochner era."
With the ability to pass purely protectionist legislation, state governments would have virtually unlimited power to regulate every aspect
of their economy. Imagine a society where every profession was required to be licensed by the government. Political savvy and highpowered connections would determine a person's livelihood.
One's
quality craftsmanship or skill would be entirely irrelevant to their success
in business. Prices on all goods would be inflated, and a black market
would inevitably open, pushing honest businessmen underground. Although this sounds extreme, such a controlling state government would
be perfectly constitutional under the majority's holding.
The Powers Court also failed to apply the reasoning of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center as the CraigmilesCourt did.204 The Court seems
to inconsistently reject the notion that Cleburne uses anything but a typical rational basis standard of review while recognizing Cleburne as some
sort of anomaly.2 °5 In its discussion of Cleburne, the majority gives its
only indication of what would constitute an illegitimate government interest, namely, a "bare desire to harm a politically unpopular minority.''2°6 The Court's reasoning implies that even if the legislation was
designed to harm non-licensed casket salespeople, it is valid because it
furthers the legitimate government interest of benefiting funeral directors. After all, casket salespeople are not a politically unpopular minority. The Powers Court seems to be saying that state governments can do
whatever they want as long as their objective is not tantamount to obvi-

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
opinion).
205.
206.

Sunstein, supranote 2, at 1697.
Id. at 1689.
Id. at 1697.
Id.
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1224 (rejecting Cleburne for reasons that are not quite clear in the
Id.
Id.
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ous and invidious racism. 20 7 This seems like a rather lenient place to
draw the line on permissible state action.
It is important to note that the Powers majority is completely unsatisfied with Oklahoma's regulatory scheme. 20 8 In fact, the court was not
able to validate the law using traditional rational basis analysis (i.e. examining whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate purpose relating to the public good).2 °9 Instead, the Tenth Circuit had to embrace
the troubling and highly suspect economic protection rationale, which
was not even put forth by the defendants. 210 In doing so, the court
impermissibly broadened the definition of what constitutes a legitimate
government purpose, and deviated from any sort of traditional rational
basis review of state economic regulations.
How the Tenth Circuit would have ruled had it considered only the
consumer protection rationale is uncertain. However, if it had been persuaded by the defendant's arguments, there would be no need to declare
economic protectionism a legitimate state interest. While it is possible
that the court wanted to use this case to establish a precedent under
which economic protectionism is an acceptable state interest, it is more
likely that the majority wished to defer to the Oklahoma legislature, but
simply could not bring itself to conclude that the licensure requirement
was rationally related to consumer protection. Thus, the court had to find
another way to validate the law.
Such judicial restraint in the face of legislation that the court knows
to be wrong is dangerous. According to Richard Epstein, "when [courts]
use transparent arguments to justify dubious legislation, they cannot raise
the level of debate. When courts ... hold that the state has the right to
fritter away their own political
say X, when they know X is wrong,21they
1
authority on an indefensible cause.",
After examining the plaintiffs' arguments, the court should have
found the Oklahoma law to be unconstitutional under a traditional rational basis review because it is not rationally related to consumer protection. Although the court may have been obligated to seek out other
possible justifications for the law,2 12 economic protectionism is not a
legitimate justification.
D. The Arbitrary Nature of the Oklahoma Licensing Scheme

One area of analysis that neither the Powers Court nor the Craigmiles Court focused on was the arbitrary nature of a regulating scheme
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See id.
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1225.
Id.
Id. at 1218-22.
Simpson, supra note 4, at 190.
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1218.
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that requires years of study completely unrelated to one's chosen profession. The Craigmiles Court "missed an opportunity to demonstrate how
absurd the FDEA's requirements truly are. 2 13 Even the majority opinion
in Nebbia recognized that "[p]rice control, like any otherform of regulation, is unconstitutional only if arbitrary,discriminatory,or demonstrably irrelevantto the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an
214
unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty."
This "any other form of215regulation" would presumably include industry
licensure requirements.
The Oklahoma law at issue violates the Equal Protection clause by
both arbitrarily treating similar groups differently and arbitrarily treating
quite different groups exactly the same.216 First of all, the law arbitrarily
treats casket salespeople differently than people selling other merchandise, "such as hardware, books and computers," because Oklahoma law
does not force people seeking to sell these types of merchandise to spend
years of their lives learning knowledge that is useless to their chosen
trade.21 7 Moreover, Oklahoma does not require a license to sell even
other funeral merchandise, such as urns or flowers.
The Oklahoma law also arbitrarily (and unconstitutionally) treats
two very different professions as if they were the same. 218 A funeral
director's role is fundamentally different from that of a casket salesperson. A casket salesperson does not need the extensive training required
of a licensed funeral director. 219 However, the Oklahoma law at issue
here "treats two distinct occupations-funeral directing and casket retailing-as if they were the same ....
The FitzgeraldCourt, quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers,
reasoned that "the Equal Protection Clause requires States, when enacting tax laws, to 'proceed upon a rational basis' and not to 'resort to a
classification that is palpably arbitrary.'

22 1

If Equal Protection provides

that tax laws cannot be arbitrary, then should it also not provide for licensing measures to also not be arbitrary? What other arbitrary method
could the state of Oklahoma employ to regulate the sale of caskets?
Could the legislature vote to simply find a random homeless man on the
street and give him a monopoly on casket sales? This would "conceiva213.
214.
215.
216,

Sanders, supra note 47, at 685.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (emphasis added).
Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 539.
Opening Brief of Appellants at 59, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
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217.
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See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 220.
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Fitzgerald,539 U.S. at 107 (quoting Allied Stories of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522,

527 (1959))-
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bly" serve the government interest of regulating casket sales because
there would only be one person to oversee. Moreover, it would certainly
advance the "legitimate" government interest in protecting the homeless
man's monopoly.222
When applying the rational basis test to intrastate economic regulations, the defendant Board in Powers claims that any conceivable government interest would be sufficient to validate the challenged legislation.223 The Board was essentially arguing that if the Oklahoma licensing
consumer
scheme could conceivably do something good (i.e., further 224
test.
basis
rational
the
under
valid
be
should
it
then
protection),
In contrast, Fitzgerald stands for the proposition that "[t]he Equal
Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason
for the classification." Under Fitzgerald,there must be a "plausible inference" that a certain piece of legislation was actually enacted to advance "some legitimate government interest. 2 25 The appropriate question is not whether the licensing requirement could advance consumer
protection in some hypothetical fact situation, but whether it is plausible
to believe that the legislature passed the law to advance consumer protection. 26 If the court is looking for just any conceivable policy reason,
then there will hardly be any law that will not pass the rational basis test.
Even the most arbitrary of classifications could conceivably relate to
some public good. For example, under the district court's assumptions, a
legislature could decide to require a person to be a licensed funeral director to sell not only caskets, but also "shoes, hamburgers, washing machines, computers, or any other type of merchandise-because, of
course, the increased regulatory oversight of those transactions" could
conceivably further the legitimate state interest of consumer protection.227 Of course, "[i]t is axiomatic that increased government regulation of a particular transaction can provide greater protection for consumers. ' 228 This mere fact does not prevent a licensure requirement from
being unreasonable or arbitrary.
What if the state of Oklahoma decided to require that casket salespeople be not only licensed funeral directors, but also licensed physicians, because some knowledge of anatomy would be helpful in their
222. See generally Powers, 379 F.3d at 1208 (reasoning that granting one group a monopoly,
for the sole benefit of that group, is legitimate. Extending this reasoning, granting one person a
monopoly would also be legitimate.).
223.
224.

See id.
Reply Brief of Appellants at 2, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-

6014).
225. Reply Brief of Appellants at 2-3, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-6014) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Central Iowa, 123 S. Ct. 2156, 2160 (2003)).
226. See id. at 2-3 & n.2 (pointing out that the actual motivations of the legislature are entirely
irrelevant under a rational basis review).
Id. at 7.
227.
Id.
228.
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trade? 229 Could the legislature further force people seeking to sell caskets to become licensed pilots or licensed architects? 230 There must be a
point where the relationship between the knowledge actually required of
casket salespeople and the requirements of the Oklahoma licensing
scheme "[rise] to the level of arbitrary and unreasonable." 231 A proper
examination of the facts reveals that the licensing scheme in this case,
which requires casket salespeople to spend years of their lives learning
information wholly irrelevant to their chosen profession, reaches this
threshold.
E. The Likely Fate of Powers v. Harris
Now that the plaintiffs have filed a writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court to appeal the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Powers, the Supreme Court will have an opportunity to decide this important issue and resolve the split between the Tenth and Sixth Circuits.
This survey suggests that the Court should evaluate Oklahoma's licensing scheme with a stricter standard of review than minimum rationality
by either (1)applying the Privileges or Immunities clause or (2) elevating the status of the right to earn an honest living that it might receive
greater judicial scrutiny. However, even if the Court analyzes this case
using traditional rational basis review, it should first use the opportunity
presented in Powers to announce that economic protectionism is not a
legitimate state purpose. This will prevent future courts from making the
mistake of the Tenth Circuit, and confusing deferential review with the
complete absence of review.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court can either accept the consumer protection rationale, or invalidate the law. This survey anticipates that the
Supreme Court would likely choose between the reasoning of the district
court in Powers and the reasoning of the Craigmiles court. Because the
plaintiffs presented incredibly strong evidence that the licensure requirement could not have conceivably been passed to protect consumers,232 this survey argues the Court should determine that the legislation
is not rationally related to consumer protection.

229. Opening Brief of Appellants at 47, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No.
03-6014).
230. Id.
231.
Id.

232. The plaintiffs argue that if the licensing requirement truly was enacted to advance consumer protection, then the legislation is plagued with inconsistencies. The plaintiffs/appellants used
an interesting analogy in their Opening Brief:
Imagine [if] the State said that one possible justification for its casket licensing requirements was the problem of spontaneously-combusting caskets. Presumably it would

arouse at least some suspicion if, in addition to providing that only licensed funeral directors may sell caskets, the legislature also decreed that caskets be stored only in wooden
buildings. True, that provision wouldn't necessarily mean the legislature's avowed concem about flaming caskets was specious, but it would certainly tend to cast doubt on it.
And eventually, if enough provisions like that were piled one on top of another, a review-
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The Court must recognize that invalidating this law would not symbolize a return to or even a step in the direction of Lochner (even though
that might not be such a bad thing). It is true that legislation is rarely
invalidated under the rational basis test. 233 However, the rational basis
test is still a test, and it is possible for some pieces of legislation to fail.
The fact that the defendants initially proffered a public health argument
and later dropped it shows that some rationales simply will not hold. 34
If the Court were to accept the consumer protection rationale, the test
would effectively lose all meaning, leaving lower courts powerless to
strike down even the most absurd and arbitrary economic regulations.
Even the concurring judge in Powers admits that he "can imagine a
different set of facts where the legislative classification is so lopsided in
favor of personal interests at the expense of the public good, or so far
removed from plausibly advancing a public interest that a rationale of
'protectionism' would fail. '235 Although the concurring opinion deserves
credit for not completely eliminating equal protection of economic liberties, it is difficult to imagine legislation further "removed from plausibly
advancing a public interest" 236 than the licensing requirements for casket
salespeople in Oklahoma.
In summary, the Powers Court failed to protect the economic liberties of its citizens by engaging in radical judicial reasoning. A strong
argument can be made that economic rights deserve more protection than
they are presently afforded by substantive due process jurisprudence.
Another strong argument can be made that the Privileges or Immunities
clause should provide at least some protection for economic liberties
against state interference. However, the Tenth Circuit needed only to
rely on the highly deferential rational-basis test to invalidate Oklahoma's
ing court might well conclude that the State's flaming-casket rationale was simply too
riddled with inconsistencies to take seriously.
Opening Brief of Appellants at 53-54, Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (No. 036014).

Consider the following inconsistencies in the licensing requirement, assuming it was
enacted to protect consumers. The licensing requirement only applies to "time-of-need" casket sales.
However, there is evidence that "pre-need" customers, for whom the death of a loved one is imminent, are often grieving as well, and thus are just as vulnerable as "time-of-need" customers. The
licensing requirement is applied only to casket sales, and not the sale of other funeral-related goods,

including urns, which are also receptacles for human remains. The licensing requirement is directly
inconsistent the position of the Federal Trade Commission, which "has enacted specific rles to
ensure that consumers are not forced to buy caskets from funeral homes." Id. The regulation directly
injures consumers through the outrageous markup in price funeral directors apply to caskets. Finally, the provision that the law only apply to intrastate casket sales effectively undoes any protection that consumers might have under the law. Out-of-state casket salespeople do not have to be
licensed in any way and do not have to go through any training. These inconsistencies make it clear
that the legislature could not have plausibly enacted the licensure requirements to advance the le-

gitimate
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public interest of consumer protection. See id. at 54-57.
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1218.
Id.
Id. at 1226 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
Id.
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licensing requirement. Unfortunately, they declared naked economic
protectionism, by itself, to be a legitimate state interest. This holding is
not supported by past precedent, historical insight, or common sense.
The Tenth Circuit should have found that protecting the economic interests of funeral directors was not by itself a legitimate state purpose.
Then, like the court in Craigmiles, the Powers Court should have adequately applied the rational basis test to strike down the legislation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent times, economic liberties have been almost completely ignored by the courts. However, economic liberties may still find some
minimal protections under the Equal Protection and substantive Due
Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Unfortunately, this protection comes in the form of the highly deferential rational basis test.
This test requires that a piece of legislation be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The court in Powers v. Harris wrongly
concluded that economic protectionism is a legitimate government interest. The enactment of naked preferences by state legislatures is absolutely prohibited by both the Equal Protection and the substantive Due
Process clauses.237 Moreover, allowing states to pass legislation based
solely on the raw exercise of political power conflicts with the views of
the founding fathers that legislatures should not be used for factional
takeovers.238 The Sixth Circuit decided a virtually identical case much
more appropriately in Craigmiles v. Giles. The Craigmiles Court correctly identified legislation unmistakably benefiting only a private interest as serving an illegitimate government interest, and further found that
the wholly arbitrary licensing requirements were not rationally related to
the legitimate government interest of consumer protection. Hopefully,
the Supreme Court will agree with Craigmilesand refuse to place the last
nail in the coffin of economic liberties. The Supreme Court should overrule Powers v. Harrisand hold that purely protectionist legislation does
not further a legitimate government interest, and arbitrary licensing requirements-such as those in Oklahoma governing licensing of casket
salespeople discussed here-are not rationally related to consumer protection or any other legitimate government interest.
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